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Abstract
We consider alternating-offers bargaining between a buyer and a seller in a dynamic
matching model where the appearance of a third party triggers a Bertrand -type
competition between the identical agents. In the continuous-time limit, Nash' axiomatic
bargaining solution holds only if buyers' and sellers' matching rates are equal.
Otherwise the equilibrium sharing rule assigns a greater fraction of the surplus to the
party facing less immediate threat of competition. This suggests that not only the
reservation values but also the partition rule according to which the surplus is divided
should be treated as endogenous in bilateral matching models.
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1 Introduction
We consider the alternating-o¤ers model à la Rubinstein (1982) in a dynamic matching
framework where a buyer and a seller bargain over the terms of trade. The novel
feature in the model is that the arrival of a third party may trigger a Bertrand-
type competition on the congested side of the negotiation table. If the new contact is
another buyer, a bidding game among the buyers ends the transaction. If another seller
interrupts the bilateral bargaining, the competing sellers lower their price o¤ers until
they are indi¤erent between selling the good and remaining unmatched. Given this
setup, we derive the equilibrium partition rule according to which the matching surplus
is shared immediately upon a newly formed match. In the limiting equilibrium where
the length of one bargaining period is arbitrarily, the outcome coincides with Nash?s
axiomatic bargaining solution (symmetric) only in the special case where buyers and
sellers contact alternative trading partners with equal probabilities. Otherwise, the
possibility of Bertrand competition gives rise to asymmetric surplus division. When
potential demand and supply in the market do not balance, the bargaining solution
favors the short-side of the market in a sense that a greater fraction of the matching
surplus goes to the party facing less immediate threat of competition. The analysis
thus suggests that in dynamic matching markets not only the parties? reservation
values but also the partition rule according to which the matching surplus is divided
should be endogenous and based on market fundamentals. This result is in contrast
with the ?xed sharing rule practice widely used in many popular applications of search
and matching theory.1 Since the bargaining solution obtained here is about as simple
as the symmetric Nash sharing rule, it should be readily applicable in various search
theoretic models.
In a closely related study, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985) also consider a match-
ing market where the possibility of meeting alternative trading partners creates a po-
tential risk of breakdown of the alternating-o¤ers bargaining. They do not, however,
allow for competition between identical agents but assume that the agent with two
alternative partners always abandons the previous partner and starts bargaining with
the new one. The limiting equilibrium of Rubinstein-Wolinsky (1985) model always
yields the symmetric Nash solution, regardless of the underlying matching rates. In
1 E.g. the Mortensen-Pissarides model (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994; Pissarides, 2000).
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our model, however, ?erce competition between the alternative partners forti?es the
e¤ect of the matching rates on traders? relative bargaining positions: the party with
better matching prospects is able to claim a greater share of the surplus.
Kultti (2000) and Kultti and Virrankoski (2004) were the ?rst to introduce the
possibility of Bertrand competition into a pairwise matching framework. These papers
show that the option to wait for alternative partners can be used to determine a unique
transaction price in a random matching model with ?take-it-or-leave-it? bargaining.
Such an extreme version of bilateral bargaining gives, however, a substantial advantage
to the party that has the right to propose the take-it-or-leave-it o¤er so that the
outcome is sensitive to the probability at which a trader gets this opportunity. In
the alternating-o¤ers bargaining, in turn, the advantage of the agent who proposes
the ?rst o¤er becomes negligible when the length of one bargaining period is small.
Therefore the limiting equilibrium partition rule is not dependent on any arbitrary
elements (e.g. the probability distribution according to which the right for the ?rst
o¤er is allocated).
2 The model
2.1 The market environment
Consider a dynamic search market where buyers and sellers randomly match and trade.
Each seller has one indivisible and homogeneous good for sale. All buyers have a ?xed
demand for one unit of the good. Both buyers and sellers have linear preferences.
Buyers? valuation for the good is denoted by y, sellers? valuation is normalized to zero.
The divisible rent in any trading opportunity is thus y.
In order to become matched in the market, agents must search for trading part-
ners. Search as such is costless but the coordination failure in the market extends the
time span an agent remains unmatched. Time is discrete and extends over in?nity,
t = 0; 1; :::; 1. Each time interval is of length ¢. The discount factor between two
periods is ± = e¡r¢ where r > 0 is the discount rate common to all agents. Poisson
arrival rates are used to measure the probabilities of locating a trading partner. The
probability that a buyer meets a seller in any given time interval is ®¢ while the prob-
ability that a seller is matched with a buyer is ¯¢. After a successful match, both the
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buyer and the seller exit the market. We only consider a stationary state where the
agents who leave the market are replaced by the same measure of new agents so that
the relative population sizes of buyers and sellers, and thereby the meeting rates ®¢
and ¯¢, remain constant over time.
2.2 Bargaining process
Upon a new match, say at time t, the agents immediately start bargaining over the
division of the rent y. The bargaining process obeys the rules of the alternating-
o¤ers procedure by Rubinstein (1982), except that the bargaining process may become
interrupted by the arrival of a third agent. If a third agent appears, a Bertrand-type
competition is triggered between the identical agents.
We assume that the seller always delivers the ?rst o¤er. We could equally well
have that right to be allocated randomly, as in Binmore (1987), but this would not
a¤ect the results as the ?rst-mover advantage becomes negligible in the continuous-
time limit, which is the ultimate goal of our analysis. If the buyer accepts seller?s initial
o¤er, transaction concludes. If the buyer rejects, she starts preparing her counter-
o¤er that will be delivered after one bargaining period ¢ at time t+ 1. However, the
bargaining process may never reach that point. Within the ?rst bargaining period
¢, another seller interrupts the bargaining process with probability ®¢, in which
case trade is conducted between the buyer and one of the sellers at a price that
drives the seller to her reservation utility. With probability ¯¢, in turn, a rival
buyer candidate shows up and the competing buyers raise their bids until they are
indi¤erent between buying the good and remaining unmatched. As we will focus on
the limiting equilibrium where ¢ is arbitrarily small, the possibility of several arriving
agents within a single time interval is not taken into account; i.e. the events with
probabilities of order (x¢)2 ; (x¢)3 ::: are ignored. Hence, the buyer will have the
chance to deliver her counter-o¤er at t+1 with probability 1¡®¢¡¯¢. If this o¤er
is rejected by the seller then the seller proposes yet another o¤er at t + 2, unless the
bilateral meeting becomes interrupted by a third agent in the meantime.
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2.3 Value functions
The expected utility of a seller proposing (receiving) an o¤er is denoted by U^s (Us).
Similarly, the corresponding utilities of a buyer are denoted by U^ b and U b. A partition
rule P it amounts to saying that the rule is proposed at time t by the agent i = b; s
(where b stands for buyer and s for seller) and it speci?es the utilities U^ i and U j =
y ¡ U^ i obtained by agent i and j (i 6= j) in a completed transaction.
Consider a match formed at t = 0. The seller proposes the ?rst o¤er Ps0 . If the
buyer rejects this o¤er, she expects to earn
Rbt=0 = ±
n
®¢
¡
y ¡ ¹U s¢+ ¯¢¹U b + (1¡ ®¢¡ ¯¢)U^ bt=1o : (1)
The ?rst term inside the curly brackets represents the probability that another seller
appears and there will be Bertrand competition between the sellers. As a result, the
sellers are driven to their reservation utility level ¹U s and the buyer earns y ¡ ¹Us. ¹U s
equals with the value of being an unmatched seller in the market. Since upon every
new match the seller gets to propose the ?rst o¤er, ¹Us is determined by the following
asset pricing equation:
¹Us = ±
n
¯¢U^s + (1¡ ¯¢) ¹U s
o
;
Solving for ¹Us obtains
¹Us =
±¯¢
1¡ ± (1¡ ¯¢) U^
s: (2)
The second term in (1) captures the probability of competition between two buyers.
In this case the buyer is driven to her reservation utility ¹U b. Since the buyer always
acts as the receiver of the ?rst o¤er, ¹U b is given by
¹U b =
±®¢
1¡ ± (1¡ ®¢)U
b. (3)
Finally, the last term in (1) represents the possibility that there will be no interruption
in the bilateral bargaining and the buyer gets to propose her counter-o¤er Pbt=1 at t = 1.
Rejection of this o¤er would provide the seller with the following expected utility:
Rst=1 = ±
n
®¢¹Us + ¯¢
¡
y ¡ ¹U b¢+ (1¡ ®¢¡ ¯¢)U^st=2o : (4)
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2.4 Equilibrium
A well-established result in the literature (Rubinstein, 1982; Binmore, 1987; Rubin-
stein and Wolinsky, 1985) is that when one assumes a stationary con?guration where
identical agents use the same bargaining tactics against all the partners they might
meet, the alternating-o¤ers game has a unique perfect equilibrium with the following
properties: P it = Pi 8t 2 [0; 1), 8i = b; s such that
U^ i = y ¡ Rj and U i = Ri i; j = b; s, i 6= j: (5)
E¤ectively this means that the agent who delivers the ?rst o¤er proposes a partition
that makes the receiver indi¤erent between accepting and rejecting the o¤er and that
the ?rst proposal thereby always leads to agreement. Using these equilibrium condi-
tions and the fact that terms involving ¢2 can be ignored, U^ s = y ¡ Rb and U b = Rb
imply
U^s =
1¡ ± (1¡ ¯¢(1 + ±))
1¡ ±2 (1¡ 2®¢¡ 2¯¢)y;
U b =
± (1¡ ¯¢¡ ± (1¡ 2®¢¡ ¯¢))
1¡ ±2 (1¡ 2®¢¡ 2¯¢) y:
Consider now the limiting equilibrium where the length of one bargaining period
¢ is arbitrarily small. Using l?Hospital rule, and remembering that ± = e¡r¢, we
obtain
lim
¢!0
U^ s = Us =
2¯ + r
2 (®+ ¯ + r)
y; (6)
lim
¢!0
U b =
2®+ r
2 (®+ ¯ + r)
y: (7)
Note that the ?rst-mover advantage of the seller becomes negligible as ¢ ! 0; i.e.
lim¢!0 U^ s = Us. Similarly, the limiting reservation values obtain
¹U b =
®
® + r
U b and ¹Us =
¯
¯ + r
Us:
As the matching surplus is given by S = y ¡ ¹U b ¡ ¹Us, the fractions of the surplus
going to the buyer and the seller yield
°b =
U b ¡ ¹U b
S
=
(¯ + r) (2® + r)
(¯ + r) (2®+ r) + (®+ r) (2¯ + r)
´ 1
1 + ©b (®; ¯)
; (8)
°s =
Us ¡ ¹Us
S
=
(® + r) (2¯ + r)
(¯ + r) (2® + r) + (®+ r) (2¯ + r)
´ 1
©s (®;¯) + 1
; (9)
where ©b (®; ¯) = (®+r)(2¯+r)
(¯+r)(2®+r)
and ©s (®; ¯) = (¯+r)(2®+r)
(®+r)(2¯+r)
=
£
©b (®; ¯)
¤¡1
.
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2.5 Discussion
In the given setup, Nash?s axiomatic bargaining with equal surplus division would
yield the following pair of utilities for buyers and sellers respectively:
U bNB =
®+ r
® + ¯ + 2r
y and U sNB =
¯ + r
®+ ¯ + 2r
y.
In is an easy task to check that the surplus shares under the symmetric Nash bargaining
satisfy °bNB = °
s
NB = 1=2. Inspection of (6)-(7) and (8)-(9) reveal that our model
produces this outcome only in the special case where ® = ¯; i.e. when the potential
demand and supply in the market balance.2 Generally, we observe that ©b is decreasing
and convex in ® while it is increasing and concave in ¯. From this it follows that °b
must be increasing and concave in ® and decreasing and convex in ¯. Obviously, the
converse is true for ©s and °s. Hence, the share of the matching surplus that an agent
is able to claim depends positively on her own matching probability and negatively on
her opponent?s matching probability, albeit both e¤ects exhibit a diminishing impact.
Compared with the model of Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985) - which produces
the symmetric Nash solution as a limiting equilibrium - threat of Bertrand competition
forti?es the e¤ect of the matching rates on the rent division and makes the equilibrium
surplus partition sensitive to the market fundamentals. This ?nding suggests that not
only the parties? reservation values but also the rule according to which the matching
surplus is divided should be treated as endogenous and dependent on the relative
matching rates. Moreover, as the limiting values for U s and U b in (6)- (7) are about as
simple as the corresponding values under the symmetric Nash bargaining, the proposed
sharing rule should be readily applicable in various search theoretic models.
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